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Abstract 
We consider a class of games that are generalizations of the minority game, in that the 
demand and supply of the resource are specified independently.  This allows us to study 
systems in which agents compete for a resource under different demand loads.  Among 
other features, we find the existence of a robust phase change with a coexistence region 
as the demand load is varied, separating regions with nearly balanced supply and demand 
from regions of scarce or abundant resources.  The coexistence region exists when the 
amount of information used by the agents to make their choices is greater than a critical 
value which is related to the point at which there is a phase transition in the standard 
minority game.  
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Competition for resources is ubiquitous in social and biological systems.  Animals 
foraging for food, companies competing for market share, clients competing for 
bandwidth on the Internet and politicians competing for votes are just a few examples.1  
In at least some such systems, agents making choices that differ from most of their 
competitors can lead to increased benefit for the agent. One important attempt to abstract 
and model the dynamics of being different is the minority game,2 which has a remarkable 
phase structure as a function of the amount of information that agents use to make their 
choices.   
 
While it clearly captures some important dynamics in competition for limited resources, 
the minority game, as it is usually specified, is limited to a specific ratio of supply and 
demand for the resource.  By construction, at most (N-1)/2 of the N agents playing the 
minority game can be rewarded in a given time step of the game.  In many real systems, 
the supply/demand may be quite different than in the minority game, and so it is of 
considerable interest to study games in which this ratio can have different values from 
that of the standard minority game.  In this paper we present a class of such models, of 
which the minority game is a special case, and study the way in which system behavior 
differs for different loads (demand vs. supply).  In particular, we show that there is a 
phase change as the relative demand on the resource changes, and that the phase diagram 
includes a coexistence region in which the collection of games with the same control 
parameters bifurcates into two distinct groups with very different behaviors. 
 
Consider, a game in which N agents compete for a resource from one of two suppliers.  
We will consider the games with more than two suppliers elsewhere.3  At each time step 
of the game, each supplier has available C/2 units of the resource, and each agent chooses 
one of the two suppliers as a source for one unit of the resource.  The agents will make 
their choices of which supplier to choose at a given time step, using a mechanism similar 
to that used in the minority game.  In particular, each agent is endowed with s (in the 
games considered here, s=2) strategies.  Each strategy is a look up table in which data 
from a set of publicly available information is used as input to determine an agent’s 
decision.  The set of publicly available information is the historical time series of which 
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of the suppliers had more requests for resource than that supply could satisfy, as a 
function of time.  Let nj(t) be the number of agents requesting resource from supplier j at 
time t.  Supplier j is underloaded at time t if nj(t)≤C/2, and is overloaded otherwise.  We 
indicate underloading of a supplier by +, and overloading by -.  Then, the state of the 
system at any given time is defined by a two-tuple (a,b), where a indicates the state (over- 
or under-loaded) of supplier 0 and b indicates the state of supplier 1.  Although there are, 
in principle, four possible states, the number of accessible states depends on the relative 
values of N and C.  If CN ≤ , then states (+,+), (+,-) and (-,+) are possible.  If N > C + 1, 
states (-,-), (+,-) and (-,+) are possible.  For the special case N=C+1, this game reduces to 
the minority game and only states (+,-) and (-,+) are accessible.  Thus, if the agents use 
information in their strategies from the last m time steps of the game, the dimension of 
the strategy space will be 3m, except if N=C+1, in which case the dimension of the 
strategy space will be 2m.   
 
An agent must choose which of its two strategies to play at a given time.  Following the 
scheme of the standard minority game, an agent will choose to play that strategy which 
would, up to that point in the game, have been responsible for the greatest gain for the 
agent, had that strategy been played for all past times of the game.  Thus, the relative 
ranking of an agent’s strategies will depend on the payoff to the agents.  In this letter, we 
will consider games with two different payoff schemes.  The first, called binary payoff, 
awards one point to each agent using an underloaded supplier, while agents using an 
overloaded supplier get nothing.  These same awards are made to strategies to determine 
their relative rankings.  The second payoff scheme, called partial satisfaction, awards one 
point to each agent using an underloaded supplier, while each agent using an overloaded 
supplier is awarded a fraction of a point equal to C/2n, where n (>C/2) is the total number 
of agents using that supplier at that time step.  The same scheme is used to award agents’ 
strategies.  Specifically, the strategy of an agent that is actually played is awarded the 
same points as the agent.  To evaluate a strategy not played, one awards one point to that 
strategy if it would have chosen an underloaded supplier at some time step, and, awards 
C/(2n) points if it would have chosen an overloaded supplier, where n is the number of 
agents actually using the overloaded supplier at that time step.  Note that these awards are 
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made assuming the same distribution of agents among the suppliers as actually occurred.  
No correction is made for the fact that had the unplayed strategy been played, the 
distribution of agents might have differed by one.  Thus, this strategy ranking scheme is 
similar to that of the naïve agents used in the first studies of the minority game.  Most of 
the results reported in this paper are for games played with binary satisfaction.  However, 
the most important aspect of our results are robust when the payoff scheme is that of 
partial satisfaction, as we shall explain below. 
 
Let σ be the standard deviation of n1(t) averaged over time for one game.  The general 
behavior of this set of games is illustrated in Figure 1 in which we present a plot of the 
average value of σ2/N as a function of N and C, averaged over 13 different runs for each 
value of N and C for binary satisfaction.4  The same plot for games played with partial 
satisfaction is qualitatively similar.  All games in this plot were played with agents all of 
whom had strategies that used information from the last 4 time steps of the game—i.e, 
m=4.  Plots for different values of m, while differing in important ways (some of which 
are described here, and some described elsewhere4) have the same general structure.  At 
the extremities, (large N, small C and large C small N) are two regions in which σ2/N is 
fairly smooth as a function of N and C.  As we move in toward the diagonal, (N=C+1), 
we pass into areas in which the dependence of σ2/N on C and N is rougher.  Moving 
further toward the diagonal from either direction, σ2/N decreases and, at least for m>2, 
has a smoother dependence on C and N.  Finally, very close to the diagonal σ2/N 
increases, reaching its maximum value near C=N.   
 
This figure has many very interesting features that will be elucidated in detail elsewhere.4  
In this letter we want to focus primarily on the most general overall structure, and, in 
particular, on the obvious difference between the region near the diagonal, in which σ2/N 
has a local maximum, and the regions further from the diagonal.  
 
To understand qualitatively what is going on, it is useful to look at a typical sample of the 
time series of, say, n1(t) for a game in the region of the central peak, and for a game from 
a region further from the diagonal.  Typical examples are shown in Fig. 2. To facilitate 
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comparison both these games have N>C.  In these figures, the dashed lines indicate the 
range of values inside of which the system is in the state (-,-), while outside the dashed 
lines the system is in the state (-,+) or (+,-).  Note that in Fig.2a the system is almost 
always in either the state (-,+) or (+,-) (about 90% of the time), while for Fig. 2b, the 
system is almost always in the state (-,-).  This is significant, since in both cases, all three 
states (-,-), (-,+) and (+,-) are in principle accessible to the system.  In the special case of 
the minority game, with N=C+1, the system must be in either (-,+) or (+,-) at each time 
step, by construction.  However, it is clear from Fig. 2a, that games played with other 
configurations of N and C not too far from the minority game configuration are 
dynamically driven to behavior which appears to be similar to that of the minority game.  
On the other hand, if N is too large for a given C, the system is in a much different phase, 
one dominated by (-,-) states in which agents typically are not rewarded.  We call the 
region in which the system is dominated by (-,+) or (+,-) states, the region of limited 
resources, while the region in which the system is dominated by the state (-,-) is the 
region of scarce resources.  The region away from the central peak, but with N<C, is 
dominated by the state (+,+), and we refer to that as the region of abundant resources. 
 
That games with N>>C (N<<C) should be dominated by (-,-) ((+,+)) states is not 
surprising.  It is also not unreasonable to suppose that configurations near the minority 
game should be dominated by (-,+) or (+,-) states (although quantitatively the minority 
game does differ dramatically from its neighbors, as we shall describe below).  But what 
is noteworthy and surprising is the way in which system behavior changes as we move 
from the region of limited resources to either scarce or abundant resources.   
 
To see this, refer to Fig. 3.  In this figure, we plot σ2/N for each of 32 runs for a range of 
values of N (N>C) with C=200 and m=6.  We see very clearly a region in N in which 
different games segregate into one of two bands.  An examination of the time series of 
n1(t) for these runs indicates that those in the upper band are qualitatively similar to Fig. 
2a, being dominated by the states (-,+) and (+,-), while those in the lower band are 
qualitatively similar to Fig. 2b, dominated by the state (-,-).  The upper band is a smooth 
continuation of the central peak region seen, for example, in Fig. 1, while the lower band 
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smoothly continues to the area of scarce resources, also seen in Fig. 1.  Thus, in this 
example, the transition between limited and scarce resources proceeds through a 
coexistence region in which the collection of games, all with the same control parameters 
(m, N and C), but with different assignments of initial strategies dynamically bifurcates 
into two distinct groups.  The first group exhibits dynamics similar to that seen in the 
standard minority game, while the second group exhibits dynamics that are quite 
different.  The behavior of the system in the scarce (or abundant) resource phase has 
some interesting features and will be discussed in detail elsewhere.4 
 
The bifurcated coexistence behavior as shown in Fig. 3 exists for values of m greater than 
a certain minimum, mc*.  If m is too small, the clear bifurcated coexistence disappears 
and is replaced by a broad, smooth, but noisy crossover between the limited resource 
region (in which the system dynamics are like those of the minority game) and the scarce 
(or, if N<C, abundant) resource region.  The value of m, mc*, below which there is no 
coexistence region is very significant.  To understand its significance, look at Fig. 4, in 
which we plot σ2/N as a function of m for both the minority game, and for neighboring 
games with N=C and N=C+2.  We see here similar curves, but with the phase transition 
offset.  The simple reason is that for N≠C+1, the dimension of the strategy space for the 
games is 3m rather than 2m as it is for the minority game.  It turns out that the bifurcated 
coexistence region exists only for m>mc*, the point of the phase transition for non-
minority game configurations.  To avoid the singular distinction between the case N=C+1 
and N≠C+1, it is convenient to consider the behavior of games as a function of δ≡D/N, 
where D is the dimension of the strategy space, i.e. D=2m for the usual minority game, 
and D=3m for the case N≠C+1.  Plotted as a function of this variable, the dips in Fig. 4 
coincide at a value δc~1/3.  Thus, the bifurcated coexistence requires a per capita amount 
of information equal to that that occurs at the phase transition in usual minority game. 
 
Parenthetically, and as we shall discuss in detail elsewhere,5 we comment that if the 
strategy space is sampled non-uniformly, there are considerable complications that arise 
both in the standard minority game and in the more general resource allocation games 
that we discuss here.  In such a case, it is tempting to consider the behavior of these 
 7
games as a function of dynamically generated variables, rather than as a function of 
external control variables, such as N, C and m.  Among the dynamically generated 
variables that most strongly suggest themselves is ζ≡ eS/N, where S is the entropy 
associated with the string of m-tuples that constitute the publicly available information. 
In the limit that all allowed m-tuples appear with equal probability, this quantity reduces 
to δ.  Using ζ as a variable rather than δ is illuminating, but carries with it it’s own 
complications, particularly vis-à-vis the problem of scaling in these games. This will be 
discussed in considerable detail elsewhere.5  
 
Finally, we note that for large m the bifurcated coexistence region persists, even though 
within each game the agents’ strategy choices are largely random.  For large m in the 
coexistence region, σ2/N either has the value ¼, associated with minority game-like 
behavior (dominated by system states (+,-) and (-,+)), or 1/8, reflecting the dynamics 
typical of the scarce resource region (dominated by system states (-,-)).  Intermediate 
values do not exist.4 
 
These results are summarized in Fig. 5, in which we present a qualitative phase diagram 
for this system.  The vertical axis represents “load” on the system.  In the case of 
experiments with fixed C, this can be thought of as a monotonic function of N.  The 
horizontal axis carries a measure of the normalized (per capita) information used by the 
agents to make their decisions.  In this figure we use δ.  This figure should be understood 
to be only qualitative.  Determining the precise positions of the phase boundaries goes 
well beyond the scope of this work.  However, this figure does capture the following 
important features: 1. The region of limited resources, dominated by minority game-like 
dynamics is qualitatively distinct from the regions of scarce or abundant resources4 and 2. 
For values of δ>δc, there is a coexistence region as we move from limited to scarce or 
abundant resources. In this region, the collection of games bifurcates, so that each game 
takes on features either of a system in the limited or in the scarce (or abundant) resource 
region.  Games with intermediate behavior do not exist.  Finally, we have observed that 
the position of the bifurcated coexistence region varies in an interesting way with the size 
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of the system.  In particular, for δ≈δc, and for a given C, the value of N at which one 
observes bifurcated coexistence, Nb, satisfies Nb-C ∝ Cp, where 1/2≥p≥3/4.4 
 
It is also important to point out that the bifurcated coexistence region is robust to some 
significant changes in the game.  In particular there continues to be a bifurcated 
coexistence region when games are played with partial satisfaction rather than binary 
satisfaction.  This is very important, since it suggests that, like the phase transition in the 
minority game, the coexistence region may be a universal feature, mediating a transition 
between two phases in a large class of games.   
 
In this paper we have examined an important class of resource allocation games that are 
generalizations of the minority game.  As the demand load on the system varies away 
from the minority game configuration (N=C+1) the system continues to exhibit minority-
game like behavior until the demand is sufficiently high (or low).  At that point the 
system exhibits a transition from a region of competition for limited resources (minority 
game-like behavior) to one of competition for scarce (or abundant) resources.  If δ≥δc the 
transition between these qualitatively different states is mediated through a surprising 
bifurcated coexistence region.  We have also studied resource allocation systems with 
more than two suppliers.  The general phase structure we have found here applies in those 
cases also, but is somewhat more complicated.3 
 
Based on our work, several important questions suggest themselves.  First, it is clear that 
in the coexistence region the initial distribution of strategies to the agents strongly affects 
which branch a given game will occupy.  However, the initial distribution of strategies to 
the agents is not always determinative of which branch a given game will occupy in the 
coexistence region.  This will be discussed in more detail elsewhere.4  Second, it is 
unclear what the fate of the bifurcation phenomenon is upon the introduction of evolution 
for the strategies.  Third, our analysis has made no direct allusion to agent wealth.  There 
is an interesting interpretation of agent wealth in the coexistence region, and that also will 
be discussed elsewhere.4  Finally, our work illustrates the continuing, even growing 
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importance of the application of concepts from the physical sciences to problems of 
collections of adaptive agents in the social and biological sciences. 
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 Figure Captions 
 
Fig. 1 σ2/N as a function of N (3≤N≤50) and C (2≤C≤70) for m=4.  
Fig. 2.  Segments of the time series of n1(t) for a games played in two different regions.  
Values of n1(t) that place the system in the states (+,-), (-,-) or (-,+) are indicated by the 
dashed lines.  a.) N=203, C=200, m=6, the limited resource region, b.) N=209, C=200, 
m=6, the scarce resource region. 
Fig. 3.  σ2/N for different runs as a function of N. (201≤N≤210) for C=200 and m=6.  32 
runs are presented for each value of N.  This figure illustrates the bifurcated coexistence 
region. 
Fig. 4.  σ2/N as a function of m for N=C+1 (the minority game configuration) and N=C 
and N=C+2, neighboring the minority game configuration. 
Fig. 5.  A qualitative phase diagram for the class of game discussed here.  The vertical 
axis is load on the system, and the horizontal axis is a measure of normalized information 
used by the agents to make their choices, specifically δ≡ D/N. 
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